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The past five years have seen significant
developments relating to the needs of crime
victims in South Africa. These include the
enactment of legislation such as the Children's
Act, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act as well as two
major policy processes relating to victims, i.e. the
Service Charter for Victims of Crime, and the
Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP).1
Therefore, the announcement that the SAPS was
to restructure the family violence, child protection
and sexual offences (FCS) services was
accompanied by some bewilderment by civil
society and government agencies alike. 
Since the late 1980s detective services relating to
sexual offences, family violence and child
protection had seemed to be on a trajectory
towards specialisation, starting with the
introduction of the child protection units. The
2006 restructuring involved shifting a wide range
of services that at the time were situated at 'area'
level, either downwards to station level or to the
provincial level. This had a profound effect on
the FCS units, which were located at area level.
The restructuring process resulted in the
disbandment of the units and staff were sent to
operate at station or 'cluster'2 level. SAPS
management argued that the rationale for the
move was that access to services would be
increased.3
Civil society commentators acknowledged the
positive intentions behind the SAPS plan, but
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questioned the implications of the move and
raised concerns about the impact of the
restructuring on the quality of service delivery to
victims. Several themes dominated the statements
of concern made by civil society commentators in
response to the restructuring. These included that
specially trained FCS detectives would now be
utilised for the investigation of other cases; that
victims would be exposed to secondary trauma if
their cases were handled by personnel that did
not have appropriate training or experience; and
that the new managers of FCS detectives at
station level would be unequipped to provide
specialised management and direction to their
staff.4
To address the lack of information about the
actual impact of the restructuring, RAPCAN
undertook research in 2007/08 to assess it. The
results are detailed in the report entitled Raising
the Bar: A review of the restructuring of the SAPS
family violence, child protection and sexual
offences units.5 This article presents a summary of
the findings and recommendations from that
study.
THE SAPS FCS UNITS
The FCS units were the end result of
developments that started in the late 1980s and
initially resulted in the establishment of child
protection units, whose mandate was to address
matters relating to child protection both of a
criminal and non-criminal nature. In 1995, the
mandate of these units was broadened to include
certain crimes relating to adults, such as domestic
violence and sexual offences. From this broader
mandate the FCS units emerged; however, by
2006 when the SAPS announced the restructuring
plan, a mix of FCS units and child protection
units existed, and there were widely differing
interpretations of the service mandates of these
units. 
Since 1995 the development of the FCS units
reflected an approach towards specialisation,
including dedicated human resources, specialised
training, dedicated resources and infrastructure
(such as buildings, vehicles, communications
infrastructure and administrative capacity), and
specialised management. An analysis of the
budget shows that in the 2002/03 financial year,
the SAPS allocated increased resources to
improving FCS units, which is evidence of an
intention to strengthen those services at the
time.6 This was in line with other developments
nationally that were aimed at attending to the
rights and needs of crime victims. Greater
specialisation in the investigation of the criminal
matters addressed by these units was matched
with concomitant developments in other parts of
the criminal justice system, most notably in the
prosecution service and the court system.
THE RAPCAN STUDY
The RAPCAN study sought to assess the impact
of the restructuring on services to victims, and to
review these developments in the context of
international trends.
Purpose and methodology
The study sought to gather information as to the
functionality of the FCS services both before and
after the SAPS restructuring process. The central
question addressed was whether the
restructuring had taken South Africa closer to its
objectives of improving services to victims, or
whether it has resulted in a weakening of these
services. While much of the SAPS
communication relating to the restructuring
emphasised that it was aimed at increasing access
to these services, civil society commentators
raised questions relating to the quality of these
services. These two themes became central to
questions addressed by the study. The study also
sought to develop a baseline in terms of what
should be defined as a high-quality service in
relation to FCS services. It was believed that this
would be important in order to have something
to measure current and future services against. In
addition, the research sought to reflect South
African developments in an international
context.
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A workshop was held in each province to build a
picture of the status of FCS services since the
restructuring, and to identify the central
strengths and weaknesses of services both before
and after the restructuring. The workshops
included FCS and other SAPS personnel,
government departments providing related
services, and civil society organisations. The
workshops also obtained the views of participants
on what high-quality FCS services should look
like and how the quality of these services should
be monitored. 
An extensive literature review was conducted,
which provided data on how such services are
conducted in comparable countries, with a view
to assessing SAPS policy in the context of
international developments and trends.
FINDINGS FROM THE PROVINCIAL
WORKSHOPS
The decision taken by the SAPS to restructure its
FCS units and redeploy personnel to cluster and
station level had a profound effect on the nature
of services delivered to victims, as well as on the
personnel that provide these services.
Generally, the findings reflect that the trajectory
towards increased specialisation in FCS cases that
was apparent before the restructuring has been
reversed by the decision to restructure. There are
no longer dedicated officers, dedicated resources,
and specialised management for cases within the
FCS mandate. This was not the intention of the
restructuring process, which was aimed at
ensuring that, by placing specialist staff at station
level, specialised services would be more
accessible.
Before the restructuring
The service consisted of a mix of FCS and child
protection units with varying approaches to
addressing the full mandate of the units. Units
served relatively small, primarily urban sections
of the country, although some rural areas also
received services. Services focused only on cases
within the FCS mandate. Units in some provinces
acted only in relation to parts of the mandate. The
full FCS investigative mandate includes serious
domestic violence-related offences of assault with
the intention to cause serious bodily harm and
attempted murder,7 all child protection matters
(including criminal and non-criminal matters) and
sexual offences against adults. 
Over time the services offered by the FCS units
became increasingly sophisticated, for example
through the introduction of forensic social
workers in provinces such as the Western Cape
and North West.
FCS officers were specifically selected for the job,
and most often also received specialised training.
FCS officers actively applied to work in the units
after making the decision to specialise in this area
of investigation. Officers could therefore plan
career paths within the specialised units. Officers
were managed and supervised by detectives who
often had significant experience in the
investigation of FCS cases. There was generally a
high level of commitment to the job,
notwithstanding high levels of job stress and some
resource constraints.
Some provinces seemed to be vastly more
resourced than others in terms of numbers of
personnel, as well as the nature of personnel
available (e.g. the Western Cape). Units also had
dedicated resources. These included office
premises that were separate from the SAPS
stations, vehicles, appropriate rooms for the
interviewing of victims, and communications
infrastructure (i.e. telephones, cell phones, Internet
access, computers and administrative staff).
FCS units were allocated budgets that were
managed in terms of their needs and priorities.
This included funds to support overtime work.
After the restructuring
The nature of services to victims of domestic
abuse, child abuse and sexual offences that would
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have fallen within the mandate of the FCS units,
continues to be varied across the country.
Services have been extended into some new rural
areas, as was intended by the restructuring.
However, in some cases this seems to have been
at the expense of areas that were previously
serviced. The new cluster-level system has
resulted in detectives covering smaller
geographical areas than was previously the case.
This can improve investigations into cases in that
area, but result in weakened investigations into
cases falling outside the new boundaries.
Inter-sectoral relationships with other
organisations assisting in the delivery of services
were reported to have been seriously disrupted
and, in one case, to have collapsed due to the
restructuring.
Officers in provinces such as North West and
Mpumalanga reported that they were now
required to investigate other matters and were no
longer dedicated to the investigation of FCS
cases.
New FCS officers brought into the system since
the restructuring did not seem to have
undergone specific selection or screening
processes such as psychometric tests. It would
appear that these officers have been deployed
into FCS work without specifically choosing this
area of work. New officers were not given specific
FCS training, although some may have received
detective training. Some newly deployed staff in
the Northern Cape did not have drivers' licences.
The statement-taking skills of new officers were
raised as a problem in KwaZulu-Natal and North
West.
FCS officers are managed and supervised by
heads of detectives at station or cluster level,
except in the Western Cape. Reportedly, few of
these heads have a clear understanding of the
process of investigation of FCS cases.
Due to the restructuring, officers in four
provinces (Eastern Cape, Gauteng, North West
and Mpumalanga) reported levels of uncertainty,
demoralisation and apathy.
Generally, resources allocated to the specialised
units were devolved to station and cluster level,
although there are some exceptions, e.g. the Port
Elizabeth area and the Western Cape, where
resources dedicated to the delivery of FCS-
related services have been maintained (at the
time the data was collected). Some provinces
reported that vehicles, telephones and computers
are no longer dedicated to, or in some areas even
available for FCS work and are being used by
general detectives at stations. Reportedly this has
had a profound impact on the ability to
investigate matters, as detectives in this situation
can no longer make contact with witnesses or
access vehicles for collecting evidence or
transporting witnesses to court.
Generally, FCS services no longer have dedicated
facilities for working with victims. In new areas
specialised resources such as victim-friendly
rooms are not available. Where FCS services are
still located in premises that previously housed
FCS units, some special facilities are still
available (e.g. in the Eastern Cape). Generally
services are delivered out of SAPS stations, and
not facilities that are appropriate for victims.
Detectives in a number of stations in different
provinces reported being expected to interview
witnesses in offices shared by several other
detectives.
FCS services no longer have their own associated
budgets. Stations and clusters could not explain
how services were to be funded, nor how
resourcing should be motivated.
FINDINGS FROM THE REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS 
The study sought to contextualise policy
developments in South Africa within
international trends as regards policing services
for FCS crimes. Three types of situations were
distinguished for analysis: poor and middle-
income countries with specialised services, richer
countries with specialised services, and countries
without specialisation. The most critical part of
the literature review was the identification of
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countries similar to South Africa in terms of
income, size, population, challenges or some
other factor (e.g. post-apartheid or post-conflict
conditions) and then assessing the arrangements
made in these countries in relation to the crime
categories under review. Given the three types of
situations that were examined, much was learnt
from comparisons involving 20 countries (ten per
cent of the world's states), managing thousands
of police stations. Services in each country were
studied in relation to organisation and
management, collaboration, success rates,
training, and resources.
Poor and middle-income countries
with specialised policing services
Ten countries were reviewed: India, Malaysia,
Nepal, Liberia, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia,
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
In all these countries services for FCS-type cases
are located at district level. One of the reasons
given for why poor and middle-income countries
deliver services at district level is that they have
fewer resources than rich countries, and fewer
professionals available at local level to manage
services. Under these conditions it makes more
sense to offer good services at district level rather
than offer many poorly run services at station
level. South Africa does not fit the described
pattern of district-level delivery, even though in
terms of many other factors it fits the general
profile of the middle-income countries like
Argentina, Chile, Malaysia or Mauritius. 
In nine out of ten of the poor and middle-income
countries reviewed there was an integrated
national plan for addressing the crimes
concerned (often relating to both prevention and
responsive services) with significant national
oversight and management. India, which like the
United States or Canada has large autonomous
states that each organises its own services, was
the exception. This was shown to result in
inconsistent and less effective delivery, as there
was no national-level group to monitor and
evaluate. 
National oversight accounted for successes both
in poor countries like Nepal, and middle-income
ones like Chile and Malaysia. In Chile there was
something exceptional: a ministry at national level
devoted not just to these investigations
(monitoring and directing the detective work on
women and children's issues), but with a mission
to eradicate serious crime problems. Much
evidence emerged to indicate that in poor and
middle-income countries, a national department
for issues such as those relating to women and
children offered many advantages in terms of
improved service delivery, over decentralised
delivery.  
All-female police stations are proliferating rapidly
around the world in poor and middle-income
countries (Nepal, India, Philippines, Pakistan,
Peru, Colombia, Nicaragua, Brazil, Ecuador,
Uruguay, Liberia and elsewhere), but no example
of this was found in the richer countries. These
stations can be within or part of regular stations
(e.g. Brazil) but are sometimes entirely different
facilities for the express purpose of handling
specific cases more sensitively (e.g. Tamil Nadu).
This dramatically increases resources since entire
stations are then devoted to responding to the
problem. Women police stations work for two
main reasons: firstly, most women beaten or
abused by men or who have had their children
hurt by them are reluctant to report to male
officers in male dominated stations who are not
always sympathetic; and secondly women seem to
make better and more sensitive investigators of
crimes against women and children. There is
empirical evidence to support this: 
• Reporting levels doubled in Brazil and India 
when all-women police stations were
established 
• In India women started pouring in to report 
crimes from earlier years when they were too
intimidated to report to male officers 
• Women police detectives took such a strong 
interest that the investigation of such crimes
increased dramatically
A number of governments, perceiving that these
detective services were successful, invested in
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specialised units to the extent that they
proliferated around the world.
Police in both Chile and Argentina are mandated
to respond to calls within minutes of a report of
child abuse or domestic violence. Argentina is
experimenting with mobile domestic violence
units with two police members ready to arrest the
perpetrator along with a psychologist and a social
worker to support the victim. They are expected to
arrive within 20 minutes of the call for assistance.
There is good grounds for a speedy approach: one
reason for low reporting rates for domestic
violence and child abuse is that much time may
pass between an incident and the victim being able
to report it; during which the perpetrator pleads
for forgiveness or threatens the victim. 
Tamil Nadu has mobile units for a different
reason, one that might also apply to South Africa:
to reach rural areas with professional teams. A
police officer, an advocate, a doctor, a social
worker and a revenue department official work
together to identify and resolve the problems on
the spot. 
There was evidence that both poor and middle-
income countries (Malaysia, Mauritius, Argentina
and Chile) showed similar trends: the creation of
interdisciplinary teams that include detectives,
psychologists, doctors, prosecutors, NGOs and
other health practitioners, and integrated,
monitored and evaluated national plans that
concentrate the resources of various departments
on the problem. 
It seems, however, that the provision of police
services to victims is not an adequate strategy for
reducing crime levels. In no example was there
clear evidence that these units prevent crimes
against women and children. Even the best
combination of services in Chile; accessible courts,
researchers, national campaigns, trained judiciary,
shelters, bringing offenders to book, and
reintegrating victims of violence into their
families, did not impact greatly on crime rates.
There was much evidence of success with regard
to increased reporting levels, crime solving rates
and victim satisfaction. However, conviction rates
in all ten countries reviewed were relatively low.
Some of the countries reviewed set high standards
in relation to the qualifications of the personnel
working in the system. While Malaysia is very
similar to South Africa in economic terms, the
110 women police investigators assigned to
Malaysia's sexual abuse and child investigations
division are required to have tertiary degrees in a
relevant subject prior to police training. 
It seems that training should not be considered a
once-off event but take place on an ongoing basis
to cover various aspects of investigations, the law
and appropriate treatment of victims. In richer
countries this is achieved with specialised units
that do nothing else but provide this in
accordance with evaluation results that determine
exactly what these training needs are. This seems
like good practice, but among the ten countries
was found to occur only in Chile. 
Many of the specialised units reviewed had their
own budgets and resources. Brazil, Argentina and
India have special women's police stations with
their own budgets, teams of lawyers, psychologists
and social workers to address these issues.
Likewise, Chile has a national department with
entire institutes directed at the joint provision of
psychological, legal, social and police services to
woman and child victims. The notable exception
to this trend was Namibia, where the women and
child units struggle to obtain (and even compete
to obtain) resources like vehicles that are needed
to sustain routine daily activities.  
No specialisation within the police
Five developing nations without specialised
policing services were reviewed. These were
Japan, Peru, Angola, Botswana and Turkey. 
The most important finding in these countries is
that the lack of specialisation had more to do with
socio-cultural factors rather than a policy choice
driven by objective studies or even economic
considerations. These factors exist across the
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economic spectrum as they occur in rich (Japan),
middle-income (Botswana, Turkey) and poor
countries (Peru, Liberia) alike.
Violence against women and children is at such
high levels in these countries that at the very least
an integrated national plan is required to make
headway against the problem. And disturbingly,
violence against women and children can spiral so
far out of control if not checked by an integrated
response that includes police that it can affect
more than 90 per cent of the population (e.g.
Angola).  
The enormity of the problem also leads to the
conclusion that specially trained police units or
even female police units would initially be more
effective than trying to reform an entire police
force deeply affected by a culture of patriarchy (for
instance Angola's police force that is made up of
male ex-combatants).
Specialised services in richer nations 
The services in rich countries under review were
so decentralised that much could be written just
about specialised police services to victims of
sexual offences and domestic violence in
thousands of cities and towns. To condense this
vast literature, only very general trends can be
examined in five countries: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United
States, involving 20 towns, cities and provinces.
Some of the more significant trends in the
wealthier countries include:
• Services decentralised to municipal or state 
level but with central offices that monitor and
evaluate programmes, establish strategy and
offer training
• Inter-departmental strategies offering a huge 
range of services and referrals according to
joint protocols
• Professionals with tertiary qualifications 
providing high levels of specialised services
including risk assessment
• Constant training prescribed by monitoring 
and evaluation units
• Rapid response teams offering mobile, 
holistic and integrated family services
• Intensive case management of both the 
victim and perpetrator for prevention
• Help desks, support services and emergency 
numbers that are advertised.
KEY CONCLUSIONS
The study came to the following conclusions:
The current system of delivery of FCS services
represents a reversal in historical developments in
South Africa that were aimed at offering a skilled,
specialised service to complainants in FCS-related
cases, premised on dedicated resourcing,
specialised training and specialised management.
The current structure for the provision of FCS
services is unable to offer dedicated resourcing,
continued specialisation of officers nationally, and
specialised management and oversight of FCS
cases.
The policy objective to prioritise crimes against
women and children cannot be realised under the
current structure.
The current situation represents an absence of
political will in government, and in the SAPS, in
relation to the prioritisation of victims, especially
in terms of crimes against women and children.
Services have been devolved to local level without
an articulated national strategy, specialised
management and oversight, and dedicated
budgets and resources.
The decision by the SAPS to devolve all area level
services to cluster and station level did not take
adequate account of the nature of FCS services,
and the impact of the restructuring on the quality
of services.
The process of restructuring in 2006 (which
affected all the provinces except the Western
Cape) resulted in confusion and uncertainty both
internally in the SAPS and externally among civil
society organisations, other government service
providers and the general public, due to
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significant weaknesses in SAPS communications.
This effect was felt also in the Western Cape where
no restructuring took place during that period.
The restructuring resulted in the placement of
FCS staff in service delivery positions. Many of
these staff members: 1) were not suitably trained,
2) were not suitably experienced, 3) did not
undergo special screening or selection, 4) had not
specifically elected to work on FCS cases, and 
5) did not have some of the basic requirements to
undertake the job, e.g. drivers' licences.
The process of restructuring, which included the
redeployment of existing FCS personnel, resulted
in the demoralisation and demotivation of FCS
officers.
The restructuring, although accompanied by some
increase in access to services, resulted in a
weakening of the quality of services provided
nationally.
South Africa is out of step with comparable poor
and middle-income countries in the world in
effectively shifting away from specialised services.
The South African government is out of step with
developments in some comparable countries that
have demonstrated significant political leadership
in responding to crimes against women and
children.
South Africa is also out of step with comparable
countries in relation to the creativity applied to
addressing some of the crime problems within the
FCS mandate.
Inter-sectoral collaboration with stakeholders that
is required to deliver essential services to victims,
has suffered due to the restructuring.
Victims have been negatively affected through the
process of the restructuring and are currently
exposed to services of questionable quality in
many areas.
The current approach to measuring the
effectiveness of services needs to be reviewed, to
assess whether there has been a reduction in
reporting.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
STUDY
The government as a whole needs to provide
political and strategic leadership in order to
respond more effectively to victimisation.
The SAPS needs to recognise that its
restructuring plans were flawed, specifically in
relation to their impact on FCS services, and
accept that remedial actions will need to be taken.
This is necessary to restore public confidence in
the SAPS, and particularly in its commitment to
prioritising crimes against women and children.
The SAPS needs to undertake a revision of the
current structure for the delivery of FCS services.
The focus should be on ensuring a continued
increase in access to services, with a concomitant
focus in ensuring the quality of these services. In
all likelihood, this will require a shift away from
station and cluster-level management to a more
centralised management of the service,
notwithstanding the location of the service at a
more local level.
The SAPS should develop and publicise a national
plan for the delivery of this service, adopting a
short to medium-term orientation. This is also
necessary for the restoration of public confidence
in the SAPS's commitment to serving victims.
This plan should set out a strategy for the
achievement of high-quality services at an
increasingly broader scale. 
The requirements of such a plan and planning
process are as follows:
• The plan should reflect the SAPS 
prioritisation of the FCS mandate and
demonstrate commitment to its
implementation through budgets and
oversight measures.
• There should be processes at provincial level 
for consultation with civil society
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organisations and other government partners
prior to the plan being finalised. One of the
objectives of this should be to establish
systems for ongoing communication and
cooperation with civil society organisations,
including their involvement in monitoring
FCS services.
• Consultations with the public should be held 
in all provinces.
• The plan should map the current demand for 
services based on crime reporting nationally,
as well as the current situation in relation to
specialised personnel, budgets and resourcing
for such services.
• The plan should demonstrate a strategy and 
budget to incrementally increase access to the
service nationally.
• This should be accompanied by plans for the 
selection and training of personnel, and
budgets for this.
• The plan should include standards in terms of 
resourcing to all FCS services, and an
incremental strategy for the provision of these
resources (with accompanying budgets).
• A structure and strategy for monitoring the 
quality of services nationally should be
included. This should include the utilisation of
indicators that are established through
consultation with the public and civil society
organisations.
• The plan must include a process for regular (at 
least annual) reporting to the public on the
achievement of objectives.
CONCLUSION
The developments described in this study indicate
the clear lack of coherence in policy between
policing, prosecution and other justice services in
relation to crime victims. If South Africa is to
respond effectively to crime victimisation, much
needs to be done to harmonise the actions and
approaches of the government departments
involved. The findings of this study place clear
obligations on the SAPS to provide a coherent
plan for the future of these services, and public
confidence in the SAPS will depend on its ability
to do so with both speed and integrity.
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
NOTES
1 For a full analysis of these policy documents, see 
C Frank, Quality Services Guaranteed: A review of
victim policy in South Africa, ISS Monograph 137,
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2007. 
2 A cluster consists of several police stations, with one of 
these acting as an administrative hub for the stations
in the cluster.
3 C Frank, S Waterhouse, R Griggs and R Rontsch, 
Raising the Bar: A review of the restructuring of the
SAPS family violence, child protection and sexual
offences units, RAPCAN, 2008, 2.
4 Ibid, 3.
5 Ibid.
6 S Waterhouse and N Mazwayi, The Department of 
Safety and Security, in Parenzee (ed) Investigating the
Implications of Ten Years of Democracy for Women:
What do the budgets say? Idasa, 2005, 79. 
7 Common assault and other offences considered less 
serious when committed in the context of domestic
violence are investigated by the general detective
services and not specialised detectives.
